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VIRTUALIZED INTELLIGENT HONEYPOT AGENT 
 







A honeypot system is described that can expand to any attack surface as it learns 
and grows with the changing device landscape. The system also takes into account the 
human elements that originated the attack. By using adversarial training mechanisms, the 
system may be quickly trained to become a doppelganger and attract attacks. Moreover, a 
unique quantum cognitive framework provides a robust adaptivity to ever-changing 
attacker strategies. Virtualized intelligent honeypot agents may be introduced into the 
network, device, or server, to connect and share knowledge to facilitate federated learning 
for similar type of agents. The agents may also be operated in multitasking for many similar 
types of devices, users, applications, and the like. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Honeypot is a well-known security mechanism for luring attackers, as well as 
studying and countering attack attempts [6]. However, with the advent of the Internet of 
Things (IoT) and wearable devices, and the ever-changing technology landscape, the attack 
surface is expanding. It is becoming increasingly difficult to adjust and create convincing 
handcrafted honeypots. IoT devices are not scanned by legacy cyber defense systems in-
depth, and remain prime targets for attackers within the network. Also, honeypots that are 
set up at a demilitarized zone or periphery of the network do not cover vulnerabilities that 
occur inside the network through wearables and other devices that enter the network. 
Recent issues with ransomware highlight the fact that the attack surface is expanding with 
devices that can enter and exit a network. It would be useful to have an intelligent system 
that can adapt to this expanding attack surface, cater to different areas of that surface, and 
make proper counterattack decisions even under a given level of uncertainty. 
Cyber attackers are improving at detecting conventional honeypots. Combining the 
ability to open attachments, interact with websites and other online services, and interact 
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with IoT devices, provides a rich contextual environment which makes client honeypot 
detection that much more difficult.  
A smart attacker knows that a simple or direct attack is unlikely to be effective. 
Hence, s/he may try to deceive the system by mixing up actions in a rather sophisticated 
plot through machine learning techniques and opportunistic decisions. For example, s/he 
can act stealthily by waiting for an opportunity (passive attacker) or can launch an attack 
immediately (active attacker), as described in [1] and illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
Moreover, the defender faces an unknown attacker with unknown intentions where 
decisions can be made dynamically on observable events that may be non-separable 
(entangled) and non-commutative, since they may depend on the order in which they are 
presented. 
 
Figure 1 - Attacker and defender in the network 
Accordingly, provided is a mechanism to identify potential attackers laterally 
entering the network using IoT and wearables. The system injects intelligent doppelganger 
agents running in a virtualized sandbox for any IoT device, application, or user that would 
normally be allowed into a network. This may include wearable devices, mobiles, 
computers, user accounts, etc. 
In one embodiment, the system locates a subject device or user and provides an 
associated agent. For a new device like a user laptop, an agent associates and acts as a 
honeypot agent for that user account. While many Mobile Device Management (MDM) 
and Information Technology (IT) systems already inject support agents, this system 
supports agents dedicated for the honeypot attack surface. The same agent then acts as an 
inciting agent in an adversarial reinforcement learning system, where the agent is trained 
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to operate in the presence of a destabilizing adversary that applies disturbance forces to the 
system [5]. The purpose of this function is to imitate and fake device functionality while 
appearing more attractive for being probed, attacked, or compromised than production 
systems that have value. This agent constantly learns how to better mimic a user’s 
interaction with the system. The agent may employ generative adversarial networking 
principles of deep learning to imitate and adapt to any device, user, or application. The 
agent changes its personality dynamically, rather than based on a fixed set of known 
vulnerabilities (e.g., manually coded for the fixed set of known vulnerabilities) as is 
typically performed on existing morphing honeypots systems. 
In a second embodiment, for more sophisticated attackers with unknown intentions 
and limited information, the classical Bayesian theory or expected utility maximization 
could be applied,  despite leading to overlooking and oversimplify the essence of the attack. 
Actually, within the classical rational model of decision-making, it is assumed that decision 
makers (honeypot agents) comprehensively define a problem, understand all possible 
alternatives and their consequences, and select the very best action after evaluating all 
available options. On the contrary, the present system considers some paradoxical aspects 
of real systems in which (human) attackers operate, which are characterized by limited 
cognitive resources, uncertainties, and complexity [2]. In particular, environments may be 
characterized by  indeterminacy effects (e.g., the state of the system does not determine a 
unique collection of values for all its measurable properties), complementary effects, 
interference effects (e.g., probing a honeypot virtual agent changes its state), violation of 
total probability effects (e.g., prior probability distributions may be zero while posterior 
distributions exist), order effects (e.g., probing two agents may lead to different measures 
depending on the order), entanglement effects (e.g., agent states for the same IoT device 
class may not be separable), and the like. To model an attacker ingenuity, the system may 
use heuristics and intuition. However, it is very difficult to find the heurist that works in 
every case, especially when a (human) attacker is involved. In this case, a quantum 
probability framework is preferable for building a corresponding quantum cognitive model 
for decision-making that resolves the irreconcilability between observed features and 
classical ideal models. 
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This formalism is already used in social science and behavioral economics as a 
probabilistic tool [2]. The use of quantum techniques requires that neither the brain nor 
consciousness would have anything to do with genuinely quantum systems. The techniques 
of quantum theory are used in this context solely as a convenient and efficient mathematical 
tool and language to capture the complicated properties associated with the decision-
making process [4]. Actually, the honeypot virtual agents use quantum probability as a 
framework to model uncertainty for a compound entangled system where agents and 
environment are inseparable, and to model how agents reflect upon their strategies for 
adapting to changing environments where defender decisions are made dynamically on 
observable events. 
The present system targets IoT devices in the network by associating each device 
with a virtual attractive (i.e., easily attacked) smart agent to form a meta-network that 
continuously locates and quarantines new threats by exchanging information and 
improving future counterattack strategies through deep adversarial learning and a 
reasoning engine. The system may build knowledge from learned strategies observed on 
attackers shared among all agents by making small changes to data samples. This model is 
predictive. Prediction is based on the generative adversarial networking principle of deep 
learning to generate adversarial behavior that imitates a device and learns new counter-
strategies. For more sophisticated protection, agents may not maximize their utility, but 
instead adapt their behavior to the incomplete information acquired from other agents and 
the environment within the limited resources they have. Non-Bayesian quantum 
probability together with a reasoning engine may be used to describe this process of 
adaptivity [3]. 
Three examples are provided as follows. First, if an Active Directory (AD) 
management system comes online, an agent associated with that system may begin faking 
group or user creation vulnerabilities. Second, for a personal device, the agent may select 
links and attachments, fill in forms with its (fake) “personal information,” and otherwise 
mimic a human who is completely unaware of good security practices. Third, for any 
device, an agent may add time warp and execution environment analytics (e.g., change in 
code signatures, memory, processes, startup code, sensitive storage areas, etc.). This 
addresses dormant ransomware and other hacks, as the sandbox agent may intelligently 
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proceed in time in a manner that would be difficult to determine because the ransomware 
could try to detect such time warps. 
Since attackers are always searching for different vulnerabilities, they can be lured 
into such an agent pretending to be a device. Since the agent is constantly learning and 
updating its behavior, the attacker may be fooled into believing that the hard-coded fake 
honeypot device is a transaction system. The quantum cognitive model provides an 
augmented framework to estimate probabilities for correct decision-making strategies and 
human probabilistic inferences. 
A general decision-making formalism is provided which includes machine (e.g., 
honeypot agents) and human (e.g., cyber attacker) elements. Artificial quantum 
intelligence may enhance the quality of the decision-making capabilities under 
environmental uncertainty and incomplete information. This demands adaptive behavior 
by virtual agents to respond to the changes in complex dynamic environments. 
Every attempt to understand the environment is an interaction ( i.e., a measure) that 
in turn affects the environment. The interaction of a cyber attacker between the 
environment and the other virtual agents is a generative process to acquire knowledge. The 
generative process takes place as a continuous interaction with the environment. Due to the 
uniqueness of every virtual agent, each generative process is unique, but decisional 
conflicts may emerge. Current approaches based on classical Bayesian theory oversimplify 
the nature of the decisional conflicts, and as a result, solutions are also oversimplified or, 
more likely, prone to being wrong or ineffective (i.e., need to be constantly adapted by 
proper heuristics) to defeat attackers. 
As opposed to classical Bayesian approaches [1], quantum cognition [2],[3],[4] 
provides axiomatically coherent answers to decisional conflicts among virtual agents under 
incomplete information and uncertainties. 
Failure to recognize that defender/attacker interactions occurred in an uncertain 
environment may lead to serious consequences, including: (1) lack of interoperability; (2) 
information vulnerabilities, which can impede the operation environment because of the 
dependencies on the decision aid tools; and (3) impeding of adaptive behavior due to 
inadequately available heuristics. 
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A non-Bayesian cyber-attack game (quantum cognitive model) of incomplete 
information reflects the defender (virtual agent)’s imperfect knowledge of incoming 
attacks (e.g., malicious or not). This one-shot game model addresses the basic questions as 
to how the defender should dynamically predict new scenarios/observations for the cyber 
attacker, and whether deception is optimal for both the attacker and defender without using 
knowledge-based techniques. This may be performed with the generative adversarial 
model. 
These techniques use generative adversarial learning and imitating devices, users 
on production network to newer device personalities, and newer user account baits for 
offering up both Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and network system 
vulnerabilities. 
In summary, a honeypot system is provided that can expand to any attack surface 
as it learns and grows with the changing device landscape. The system also takes into 
account the human elements that originated the attack. By using adversarial training 
mechanisms, the system may quickly train to become a doppelganger that can attract 
attacks. Moreover, a unique quantum cognitive framework provides a robust adaptivity to 
ever-changing attacker strategies that adequately model human causal reasoning. 
Virtualized intelligent honeypot agents may be introduced into the network, device, or 
server, to connect and share knowledge to facilitate federated learning for similar type of 
agents. The agents may also be operated in multitasking for many similar types of devices, 
users, applications, etc. 
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